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Reflections on the BCCI Affair:
A United Kingdom Perspective
The issues considered in this testimony are divided into two categories:
(1) preventive regulation designed to prevent banks from getting into difficulties,
and, (2) protective regulation designed to protect depositors and the stability of
the financial system when a bank encounters serious problems.
I. Preventive Regulation
A. GUIDELINES ON THE ALLOCATION OF
REGULATORY RESPONSIBILrrIES
The 1983 Basle Concordat lays down guidelines for allocating regulatory
responsibilities between home and host country authorities in respect of the
liquidity and solvency of international banks. 1 However, the Concordat does not
address the question of fraud, nor does it say which authorities are responsible
for determining whether senior bank management is fit and proper. In light of
BCCI, it would seem that clarification is needed in this area and it may be
appropriate, as suggested by the British Bankers' Association, that host author-
ities should have specific responsibility for assessing the suitability of the man-
agement of foreign banks.
The Basle Concordat places primary responsibility for regulating the solvency
of a foreign branch on the home country, which for this purpose means the
country of incorporation. However, in the case of BCCI Luxembourg, as parent
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1. The Basle Concordat, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 900 (1983), is a nonlegally binding agreement
signed by the Group of Ten countries: all nations with representatives on the Committee on Banking
Regulation and Supervisory Practices. This Committee, which operates under the auspices of the
Bank for International Settlements, seeks not to harmonize national laws and practices, but rather, to
coordinate disparate regulatory regimes with a view toward ensuring that all banks are supervised
according to certain broad principles.
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authority, has stated that "it was impossible to exercise adequate consolidated
supervision over a group 98 percent of whose activities fell outside its jurisdic-
tion and for which none of the other banking supervisory authorities involved
was prepared to take responsibility as parent authority." 2 This gulf between legal
structure and economic reality suggests the need for an alternative definition of
home country jurisdiction. The EC Commission has proposed the main place of
business while others favor the location of central management. The simplest
approach (now adopted by Luxembourg) is for countries to refuse to incorporate
banks whose main business lies outside their jurisdiction.
The Basle Concordat states that where holding companies are at the head of
groups that include separately incorporated banks operating in different countries
(the BCCI situation) the relevant supervisory authorities should endeavor to
coordinate their supervision. However, BCCI has shown that such corporate
structures can make effective supervision impossible (see below) and it would
therefore seem more appropriate to prohibit these structures altogether.
B. CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION
It is a central principle of the Basle Concordat that the soundness of a bank
cannot be properly assessed "unless [regulators] can examine the totality of
each bank's business worldwide through the technique of consolidation. ' 3 Yet
BCCI's complex structure enabled it not only to escape consolidated supervision 4
but to deliberately confuse regulators by shuffling its assets between different
jurisdictions. In the words of John Bartlett of the Bank of England: "The Group
structure and the way in which transactions have been dealt with within the
Group makes it very difficult to understand what has been or is being done in the
name of BCCI." 5
In similar vein, U.S. regulators have stated that "BCCI operated without a
supervisor who could regulate and examine the consolidated financial organiza-
tion, and BCCI was therefore able to manipulate its books and conceal its actual
financial condition with minimal chance of detection." 6 One example is suffi-
2. See H.C. (1991-92) 177-i, app. 8.
3. 22 I.L.M. 901 (1983).
4. Under consolidated supervision, parent banks and their supervisory authority monitor ex-
posure to risk and capital adequacy on a groupwide basis. Such supervision does not necessarily
involve consolidated accounting. See Consolidated Supervision of Institutions Authorized Under the
Banking Act 1979, Bank of England Notice (Mar. 1986).
5. Affidavit in support of the petition to wind up BCCI, July 1991, at 2-3 [hereinafter Bartlett
Affidavit].
6. Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 44 (1991) (Testimony of Virgil Mattingly, William Taylor, and Gerald Corrigan). In this
context, it is interesting to note that as early as 1975-76, the then-New York Superintendent of Banks,
Mr. John Heimann, blocked attempts by BCCI to establish a banking presence in the United States
because it lacked a primary regulator. House of Commons Treasury and Civil Service Comm., Fourth
Rep., Banking Supervision and BCCI, Mar. 1992, Minutes of Evidence, at 20.
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cient to demonstrate the ease with which BCCI avoided consolidated regulatory
oversight of its operations. In the 1970s, BCCI's loans to the Gulf shipping
group were moved from the U.K. to Grand Cayman in order to circumvent the
large exposure guidelines imposed by the Bank of England in 1977. 7 Such loans
averaged around 60 percent of BCCI's stated capital in the period 1977-81, far
in excess of any reasonable prudential limit.
8
One clear lesson from the BCCI affair, therefore, is that consolidated super-
vision should be mandatory for all international banks without exception. Unsafe
corporate structures should not be "grandfathered ' 9 (as happened under the
U.K. 1987 Banking Act) or permitted by way of exception (as under the Basle
Concordat). In this context it is interesting to note that the latest U.S. banking
legislation includes the requirement that U.S. branches of foreign banks must be
subject to comprehensive consolidated supervision in their home country. 10
C. ADEQUACY OF SUPERVISORY STANDARDS
The Basle Concordat attempts to ensure adequate supervisory standards by, in
effect, requiring parent and host authorities to assess the quality of each other's
supervision. Thus where a host authority considers that supervision of the parent
institution of a foreign bank operating on its territory is inadequate, "the host
authority should discourage or, if it is in a position to do so, forbid the operation
in its territory of such foreign establishments."" Alternatively, "the host au-
thority could impose specific conditions governing the conduct of the business of
such establishments."
1 2
Under the 1987 Banking Act, the Bank of England must satisfy itself that a
bank meets the various statutory criteria for authorization. However, in the case
of a bank whose "principal place of business" is in a country outside the U.K.
the Bank may view these criteria as being met if (a) the relevant supervisory
authority in that country informs the Bank that it is satisfied as to the prudent
management and financial soundness of the institution and (b) the Bank is sat-
isfied as to the quality of supervision exercised by that authority.
It is not entirely clear as to how the Basle guidelines and the U.K. statutory
principles were applied in the case of BCCI. Luxembourg was not BCCI's
"principal place of business" and the Luxembourg authorities themselves felt
unable to supervise adequately BCCI's operations-a concern which eventually
7. Report on Sandstorm SA (BCCI) under section 41 of the Banking Act 1987, June 22, 1991,
at 22.
8. Id. at app. I.
9. Under the 1987 Banking Act, supra note 6, institutions which had previously been licensed
as deposit-takers, but not accorded full bank status, were automatically authorized as banks.
10. 137 CONG. REc. H11775 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991).
11. 22 I.L.M. 903-04 (1983).
12. Id. at 904.
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led them to require BCCI to leave their jurisdiction. 13 Given BCCI's uncertain
regulatory status, some form of restriction on BCCI's activities in the U.K.
would presumably have been in keeping with the Basle Concordat's guidelines.
In view of the above, there is reason to question whether the Basle arrange-
ments for ensuring adequate supervisory standards are working properly. Within
the European Community, supervisory standards could be significantly strength-
ened by the EC Commission's current proposal to make the home country ju-
risdiction responsible for deposit insurance. Beyond this, national regulatory
authorities appear generally to be opposed to any involvement in the supervisory
process by a supranational body such as the International Monetary Fund. Nev-
ertheless, it is worth noting that the IMF does already fund and organize tech-
nical assistance in banking supervision to LDCs and Central and East European
countries. Furthermore, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in the
U.S. has specifically suggested that the IMF might conduct formal supervisory
reviews which could be incorporated into its existing country surveillance and
consultation procedures. 
1 4
D. SUPERVISORY ROLE OF BANK AUDITORS
Banks' external auditors have an important role to play in the regulatory
process. In the first place, regulatory authorities may look to auditors to provide
them with relevant supervisory information.
Second, financial statements are relied upon by financial markets to assess and
monitor the credit standing of banks-a crucial form of self-regulation. These
two aspects of the auditors' supervisory role are considered briefly below.
1. The Relationship Between Auditors
and Regulatory Authorities
In some regulatory regimes (the U.S. being a notable example) the regulators
have their own teams of bank examiners who undertake regular on-site bank
inspections. Here, the bank's external auditors do not normally report to the
regulators. At the other extreme there are regulatory regimes, including several
in Continental Europe, where extensive supervisory reliance is placed on bank
auditors, who may have statutory obligations to report certain matters directly to
the regulatory authorities.
The present U.K. arrangements fall somewhere between these extremes. Un-
der the 1987 Banking Act, bank auditors are relieved of their confidentiality
obligations when reporting to the Bank of England, but the reporting arrange-
13. Since the mid-1980s, Luxembourg had been trying to persuade BCCI to move out of its
jurisdiction. Finally, in June 1990, the Luxembourg authorities gave the Group until June 30, 1991,
to cease operating in Luxembourg and to transfer its operations elsewhere. Bartlett Affidavit, supra
note 4, at 9.
14. See H.C. (1991-92) 177-i, app. 6.
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ments themselves are governed by informal guidelines rather than statute or
regulation. 15 At the same time, the Bank of England has adopted a recommen-
dation made after the Johnson Matthey Bank collapse in carrying out periodic
on-site bank examinations with a view to assessing the quality of management
and the adequacy of banks' control systems-a practice followed in the case of
BCCI.
Although evidence from the Bank of England suggests that the present rela-
tionship between the Bank and reporting accountants is working well, there are
grounds for concern.
It is a statutory condition for authorization that a bank maintains "adequate
accounting and other records of its business and adequate systems of control of its
business and records." 16 The Bank of England has issued detailed guidelines on the
scope of this requirement which apply to U.K. branches of foreign banks "regard-
less of whether any part of the business is supervised by another regulator." 17 In the
case of BCCI the requirement was not met. Indeed, in support of its application for
a winding up of BCCI the Bank of England made the point clearly:
It appears from the Price Waterhouse Report (of June 1991) that the accounting records
have completely failed and continue to fail to meet the standard required of institutions
authorized under the Banking Act. It further appears that there is no proper or adequate
system of controls for managing the business of BCCI. 8
It is surely a matter for concern that such fundamental shortcomings became
apparent only during the section 41 investigation in 1991 and were not discov-
ered during: (a) the normal auditing process; (b) the numerous accountants' in-
vestigations commissioned by the regulators prior to 1991; (c) in particular the
section 39 report commissioned in March 1990 to investigate if there were
adequate systems and controls in place in the U.K. operation; and (d) the various
Bank of England examinations of BCCI's control systems in the U.K.
In the light of this experience, consideration should surely be given to the
desirability of appointing accountants other than the bank's own auditors when
special investigations are called for. In addition, it may be desirable to strengthen
the Bank of England's own investigative capacity in this area.
2. The Relationship Between Auditors
and Financial Markets
Credible financial statements lie at the heart of the self-regulatory process. It
is on the basis of such statements that depositors, general creditors, credit rating
15. See THE BANK OF ENGLAND'S RELATIONSHIP wITH AUDITORS AND REPORTING ACCOUNTANTS
(Dec. 1987).
16. U.K. Banking Act 1987, Schedule 3, Section 4(7).
17. See BANKING SUPERVISION DIVISION, BANK OF ENGLAND, GUIDANCE NOTE ON ACCOUNTING
AND OTHER RECORDS AND INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS AND REPORTING ACCOUNTANTS' REPORTS
THEREON (Sept. 1987).
18. Bartlett Affidavit, supra note 4, at 13.
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agencies, and other market participants are able to assess the credit standing of
individual banks. Bank auditors therefore have a key role in ensuring that reliable
financial information is provided to the marketplace.
There is, however, a difficulty here in that recent case law has established that
an auditor's duty of care is confined to the general body of shareholders only and
does not extend to general creditors or other stakeholders.1 9 This point has
particular significance in relation to banks, which are typically dependent on
depositors rather than shareholders for well over 90 percent of their total funding.
Since the interests of depositors and shareholders are not necessarily the same,
this leaves depositors in an unsatisfactory position: as the predominant suppliers
of funds to banks they do not have access to financial statements which are
prepared with their interests in mind.
This weakness in the self-regulatory regime is amply illustrated by the BCCI
experience. BCCI's 1989 accounts were not qualified, even though the auditors
were aware of serious problems, the nature of which had been reported to the
bank's majority shareholders. In explaining the decision not to qualify, the au-
ditors have argued that in general terms a bank's accounts cannot be qualified
without risking a collapse in confidence and a potentially calamitous withdrawal
of deposits. While this approach may be consistent with an auditor's established
legal obligation to shareholders, it is not necessarily in the interests of existing
depositors, cannot be in the interests of prospective depositors, and is difficult to
justify on public policy grounds. In particular, once it becomes known that
banks' accounts will never be qualified, bank financial statements cease to be a
source of reliable information on the basis of which markets can fulfill their key
role of credit assessment. For the banking system as a whole the absence of
credible financial information is likely to mean an increased incidence of desta-
bilizing bank runs.
A radical solution to this problem would be to broaden bank auditors' duty of
care to include depositors. Such a step would, however, inevitably involve a
large increase in auditing costs (notably the costs of professional indemnity
insurance) and it is a matter of judgment as to whether the increased protection
for depositors would justify such a step.
E. BANK SECRECY
Evidence received from the U.S. regulatory agencies suggests that bank se-
crecy can be a serious problem in supervising multinational banks such as BCCI.
It seems that such laws can "greatly impede" access to customer information
while also restricting the sharing of such information with regulators from other
19. In Al Saudi Banque v. Clarke Pixley (1989) it was held that the company's auditors owed no
duty of care to lending banks. Furthermore, in Caparo Industries v. Dickman (1990) the House of
Lords determined that the auditors' duty of care is confined to the general body of shareholders.
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countries. 20 Furthermore, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency states
that "our collective experience ...strongly suggests that bank secrecy laws
have all too often been used as a cloak to conceal unlawful activity." 21 The U.S.
Federal Reserve Board also believes that criminal activity may be attracted to
jurisdictions which combine weak supervisory arrangements with stringent bank
secrecy laws. 22 These observations again highlight the absence of any mecha-
nism within the present international regulatory framework for ensuring the
adequacy of supervisory standards.
II. Protective Regulation
A. CRITERIA FOR REVOKING/RETRICTING AUTHORIZATION
OF A FOREIGN BANK
Given the wide discretionary powers it possesses to revoke authorization (in
particular sections 1 l(1)(a) and 1 I(1)(d) of the Banking Act 1987) it would seem
that the Bank of England could have revoked BCCI's authorization some time
before the decision was taken to seek liquidation. This might have been done by
imposing a time-limited authorization so as to permit an orderly repayment of
deposits. Alternatively, BCCI's U.K. operations could have been curtailed under
a restricted authorization. However, the Bank's stated policy 23 is to avoid revo-
cation or restricted authorization where it considers that speedy remedial steps
are likely to be taken (for example, injection of new capital, appointment of new
directors) and that such action would protect the interests of existing and poten-
tial depositors. One issue which needs clarification here is whether the interests
of potential depositors should be given equal weight with those of existing
depositors. FOr instance, in the case of a bank under suspicion or investigation,
might it not be reasonable in the interests of potential depositors to prohibit the
solicitation of new deposits (as allowed for in section 12 of the Banking Act),
even if this entails some increased risk for existing depositors?
In his evidence before this Committee the Governor of the Bank of England
indicated a number of reasons for not taking action against the U.K. branches of
BCCI prior to July 1991. These reasons included (a) the policy of preserving
banks where possible,24 (b) the fact that the U.K. branches appeared to be "not
working badly" with possibly an asset surplus ,25 (c) the practical difficulties of
dealing with a foreign bank incorporated overseas, 26 (d) the appeal procedure
20. See H.C. (1991-92) 177-i, app. 6.
21. Id.
22. See H.C. (1991-92) 177-i, app. 9.
23. See BANKING SuPERvIsIoN DIVISION, BANKING AcT 1987 SECTION 16: STATEMENT OF PRIN-
CIPLES (May 1988).
24. Second Report from the Treasury and Civil Service Committee, H.C. (1991-92) 26, Q.I.
25. Id. Q.13.
26. Id. Q.77, Q.86.
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under the 1987 Banking Act,27 (e) the need to succeed in the Luxembourg
courts, 28 (f) the need to persuade the Luxembourg regulatory authorities, 29 and
(g) the fear of triggering a generalized run on BCCI's global operations.3 °
In view of the wide statutory powers available to control U.K. branches of
foreign banks, and the apparent difficulties encountered in exercising those pow-
ers, it is necessary to consider the various policy options for "ring-fencing"
branch operations in the U.K.
In this context it should be noted that the Bank of England was sufficiently
concerned about BCCI to attempt to "ring-fence" its U.K. branches (that is,
financially insulate these branches from BCCI's non-U.K. operations) by limit-
ing the extent to which deposits gathered in the U.K. could be used to fund other
parts of the Group overseas. However, this initiative appears to have been largely
ineffective in protecting U.K. depositors.
B. RING-FENCING ThE U.K. OPERATIONS OF FOREIGN BANKS
There are three alternative approaches to regulating the U.K. branches of
foreign banks-bearing in mind that branches, unlike subsidiaries, have no sep-
arate legal identity and are, from a legal standpoint, part of the group to which
they belong.
First, there is the present regime of relying heavily on the quality of home
country supervision to protect the interests of depositors in the host jurisdiction.
The problem here is to ensure adequacy of supervisory standards in the home
country. As noted previously, the U.S. has responded to this difficulty by passing
legislation allowing authorization of a foreign branch in the U.S. only if the bank
is subject to "comprehensive supervision or regulation on a consolidated basis
by the appropriate authorities in its home country." 31 However, such a require-
ment only serves to emphasize again the absence of any international mechanism
for monitoring supervisory standards.
Second, it would be possible to require foreign banks to operate through
subsidiaries rather than branches-an approach that is now under review in the
U.S. (It is relevant to note here that the Bank of England evidently rejected a
proposal in the mid-1980s that BCCI's operations in the U.K. should be
incorporated-although U.K. incorporation was one element of the planned
restructuring of BCCI being considered by the Bank of England and other reg-
ulators in early 1991). The British Bankers' Association has suggested that for
non-EC banks the Bank of England should be given reserve powers to require a





31. 137 CONG. REC. H11,775 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991).
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the quality of home country supervision. 32 This would, however, be a very
cumbersome policy instrument and one which would very likely trigger a run on
the bank if exercised.
Finally, the insolvency rules could be changed to allow U.K. branch assets to
be assigned to U.K. depositors. The present position in English law has been
stated as being that "the attempt to put a ring-fence around either the [branch]
assets or the [branch] creditors to be found in any one jurisdiction . . .is not
correct and destined to failure.' 33 However, this is not the position in some other
countries. For instance, section 606 of the New York State Banking Law provides
that where the Superintendent of Banks closes a foreign branch he may take
possession of the property of that branch (as well as any property of the foreign
parent situated in New York State) and the branch depositors and creditors will
then have a preferential claim against those assets. Only when these preferential
claims have been met will any surplus be turned over to the principal office of the
foreign bank or its liquidator.
Any unilateral change in insolvency rules along these lines would invite re-
taliatory action by other countries. What is urgently needed is a multilateral
approach to insolvency law that would avoid the conflict-of-law problems that
have already been encountered in BCCI's liquidation proceedings.
C. LENDER OF LAST RESORT
One of the lessons of BCCI is that it is dangerous for a large international bank
to be permitted to operate without access to a lender of last resort. According to
Price Waterhouse, the senior management of BCCI believed that the bank could
not afford to show a weak balance sheet or poor operating results "given the
bank's vulnerability as result of the absence of a lender of last resort."34 It was
apparently this thinking which lay behind the subterfuge to disguise losses on
loans to the Gulf Group in early 1985 and which also helps to explain BCCI's
failure to disclose the Treasury losses incurred in the period 1977-1985.
If reliance is to be placed on home country supervision in the case of foreign
branches operating in the U.K., it is surely also appropriate to require, as a
condition of authorization, that the home country jurisdiction has a lender of last
resort capability.
HI. Conclusion
The fundamental policy issue arising out of the BCCI collapse is whether
national authorities failed to use their existing regulatory powers in an appropri-
32. See H.C. (1991-92) 177-i, app. 3.
33. Statement by the Vice-Chancellor, Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson, in the Winding Up Pe-
tition to Wind Up BCCI, July 30, 1991, at 9.
34. Report on Sandstorm SA, supra note 6, at 1.
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ate manner or whether the apparent supervisory failure was mainly the result of
defects in the international regulatory regime. Any assessment is complicated by
the fact that until BCCI's closure regulators were seeking to protect depositors by
securing the financial and managerial support of the majority shareholders rather
than by terminating or restricting the bank's activities.
Whatever the final judgment on this point, the BCCI affair has highlighted a
number of weaknesses in present international regulatory arrangements.
First, the responsibilities of home and host regulatory authorities set out in the
Basle Concordat need to be further clarified.
Second, the principle of consolidated supervision should be applied without
exception to all banks operating internationally, even if that means dismantling
some existing structures.
Third, the Basle approach to regulatory coordination does not incorporate any
effective mechanism for assessing the adequacy of supervisory standards. This is
a matter of particular concern in relation to those offshore financial centers which
tend to attract criminal activity by combining stringent bank secrecy laws with
lax supervision.
Fourth, the regulatory role of bank auditors should be reviewed. The practice
of appointing a bank's own auditors as investigating accountants may not always
be appropriate. More importantly, financial markets may be better served by
widening bank auditors' legal duty of care to include depositors-although the
costs of such a move would have to be carefully considered.
Finally, all international banks should have access to a lender of last resort in
their country of origin and this should be a condition for authorization.
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APPENDIX
Bank of Credit and Commerce
International (BCCI) Timetable
of Events: 1972-1991
1972 BCCI SA (owned directly by its shareholders) incorporated in
Luxembourg.
1974 Current structure of BCCI (a number of subsidiaries below a
Luxembourg holding company) created.
1976 New York regulators turn down BCCI's attempts to buy a U.S.
bank using an intermediary because of BCCI's lack of a lead
regulator.
1978 U.S. court affidavit shows Bank of America (30 percent share-
holder in BCCI) critical of BCCI's lending. Bank of America
decides to dispose of its shareholding in BCCI. (Divestment
completed in 1980.)
1978 U.K. branch expansion blocked by Bank of England.
1980 Bank of England turns down BCCI's request for recognized
status under Banking Act 1979. Instead accorded licensed
deposit-taker status.
1985 Huge losses revealed in BCCI's Treasury Division (legally part
of BCCI (Overseas) Ltd., the Cayman Island Company). This
division transferred to Abu Dhabi.
1985 Bank of England discourages Luxembourg's suggestion that
BCCI set up separately incorporated company in U.K. so that
Bank of England take on role of lead regulator.
1986 Ernst & Whinney writes to BCCI complaining about excessive
management power and weakness of BCCI's accounting con-
trols.
1986 BCCI's Treasury Division losses (see 1985 above) revealed to
Bank of England.
1987 Price Waterhouse appointed sole auditor.
1987 Establishment of College of Regulators for BCCI agreed.
1987 BCCI, as licensed deposit taker recognized under 1979 Banking
Act, is automatically authorized under 1987 Banking Act.
June 1988 First meeting of College of Regulators.
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Oct. 1988 Drug indictment against BCCI (relating to Tampa branch) issued
in U.S. BCCI's U.K. management sets up investigation. Bank
of land kept informed. Bank of England insists on daily balances
and liquidity statistics, and on weekly meetings.
Feb. 1989 Bank of England's meeting with BCCI become monthly and
figures weekly.
Jan. 1990 Bank of England institutes formal review of U.K. operations of
BCCI in respect of drug money laundering.
Early 1990 Bank of England becomes aware of terrorist finance accounts at
BCCI.
Mar. 1990 Evidence of poor banking emerges from Price Waterhouse's
work on BCCI's 1989 report and accounts.
Mar. 1990 Section 39 report commissioned by Bank of England from Price
Waterhouse on adequacy of BCCI's accounting system to detect
drug money laundering.
Mar. 1990 Under pressure from Price Waterhouse, BCCI sets up task force
to review bad loans and related transactions, using Price Wa-
terhouse's report of March 14th as briefing note.
Apr. 1990 Price Waterhouse's report to the Board of BCCI (received by
Bank of England on April 18th) sets out task force findings,
including confirmation of previously identified problem loans,
but also finds evidence of accounting transactions and state-
ments mainly offshore, being "either false or deceitful." Rec-
ommends contingency provisions. Bank of England later argued
this report contained no evidence of systematic fraud.
Apr. 4, 1990 Governor of Bank of England briefs the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer on aftermath of Tampa.
Apr. 20, 1990 College of Regulators meets. Considers Price Waterhouse's re-
port. Leads to injection of capital (in mid-1990) by Abu Dhabi,
which gives it shareholding of over 75 percent.
Apr. 30, 1990 College of Regulators meets. Still not satisfied by current pro-
visions, wants $600m. Reported to College that in-house re-
organization committee has been set up to reorganize BCCI.
Headquarters to be moved to Abu Dhabi.
May 16, 1990 Governor of the Bank of England briefs the U.K. Chancellor on
BCCI's reconstruction plans.
June 1990 Luxembourg gives BCCI a year to move its operations.
June 1990 Price Waterhouse's section 39 report shows BCCI's systems and
controls are satisfactory.
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Oct. 1990 Follow-up to Price Waterhouse's April report shows need for
additional financial support of $1.5n 35 needed to cover potential
losses. Said previous management may have colluded with cus-
tomers to misstate transactions. Abu Dhabi agrees to meet li-
abilities and make management changes. Naqvi and Abedi step
down. Bank of England later says it still had no evidence of
fraud to justify revocation at this stage.
Dec. 1990 In last week of December, BCCI executive tells Price Water-
house of substantial unrecorded deposits.
Jan. 1991 In first week of January, Bank of England is told of these un-
recorded deposits. Abu Dhabi agrees to make good any shortfall
in respect of these deposits. Price Waterhouse informs Bank of
England that some irregular transactions may have gone through
U.K. branches and investigates, keeping Bank informed.
Jan. 25, 1991 Bank of France bans BCCI from taking new deposits because
of inadequate capital requirements.
Mar. 4, 1991 Price Waterhouse commissioned to investigate BCCI under sec-
tion 41 of Banking Act.
Apr. 1991 Bank of England briefs the Chancellor that BCCI's U.K.
branches in "pretty sound shape."
36
May 1991 Financial package signed by BCCI's shareholders.
June 24, 1991 Bank of England receives Price Waterhouse's draft section 41
report. Report reveals "massive and widespread fraud" going
back a number of years and involving not only past but existing
management, even after the reconstruction. Uses evidence pro-
vided by Naqvi's 6,000 personal files, previously concealed
from Price Waterhouse.
June 28, 1991 Governor of the Bank of England receives the section 41 re-
port. 
37
July 1, 1991 Bank of England alerts Serious Fraud office.
July 2, 1991 College of Regulators meets. Abu Dhabi not informed.
July 4, 1991 Governor of the Bank of England informs Prime Minister and
Chancellor of decision to close BCCI.
July 5, 1991 Coordinated closure of BCCI.
36. Date revised from that given by the Governor of the Bank of England in H.C. (1991-92) 26,
QQ.22-23.
37. Date revised from that given by the Governor of the Bank of England in H.C. (1991-92) 26,
Q.70.
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